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1. WOULD PRESIDENT OBAMA HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD A
U.S. CITIZEN WITHOUT CHARGE IN A MILITARY BRIG FOR SIX MONTHS
IF THAT CITIZEN-WHO LIVES IN MINNESOTA-IS SUSPECTED OF LINKS
TO AL QAEDA FOLLOWING A ONE-MONTH TRIP TO SOMALIA?

The legality of the proposed action should be analyzed in the
context of a habeas corpus proceeding in federal court. That is, one
should assume that the prisoner would, through counsel, challenge
the lawfulness of the military detention by filing a writ of habeas
corpus. Thejudiciary would then proceed to examine the parameters
of the President's power as commander in chief to apprehend and
detain citizens who may be aiding and abetting al Qaeda on U.S. soil.
The Constitution provides: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it."1 Byway of background, the
writ of habeas corpus is a venerable legal procedure that allows a
prisoner to get a hearing before an impartial judge. If the jailor is
able to supply a valid basis for the arrest and imprisonment at the
hearing, the judge will simply order the prisoner to be returned to
jail. But if the judge discovers that the imprisonment is illegal, he has
the power to set the prisoner free. For that reason, the Founders
routinely referred to this legal device as the "Great Writ" because it
was considered a fundamental safeguard of individual liberty.
The most relevant Supreme Court case is Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.
Yaser Hamdi was initially captured by the American military in
Afghanistan and was then transferred to the prison facility at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. When the military authorities discovered that
Hamdi was an American citizen, he was moved to a military brig in
South Carolina. Because Hamdi was denied access to family and legal
counsel, his father filed a writ of habeas corpus on his behalf in
federal court. The Bush administration could have simply explained
to the court its reasons for jailing Hamdi-that Hamdi was captured
on an overseas battlefield-but it chose to respond to that petition by
urging the district court to summarily dismiss the petition because, it
argued, the court could not "second-guess" the President's "enemy
combatant" determination. 3 That assertion struck at the heart of
habeas corpus. If the judiciary could not "second-guess" the execu-

1. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
2. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
3. Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 28, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278
(4th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-6895).
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tive's initial decision to imprison a citizen, the writ never would have
acquired its longstanding reputation in the law as the Great Writ.
If Congress has not suspended the writ of habeas corpus, the law
is clear. The prisoner must be able to meet with his attorney in order
to adequately prepare for their day in court. That day is significant
because it may be the prisoner's only opportunity to persuade ajudge
that a mistake has been made or that an abuse has occurred.
President Bush's attorneys tried to advance the astonishing notion
that habeas corpus petitions could be filed-as long as they were all
immediately thrown out of court. President Bush's attorneys failed to
persuade the Supreme Court that his enemy combatant policy was
lawful.4 Writing for the Court, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor noted,
"We have long since made clear that a state ofwar is not a blank check
for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens."5
The plurality opinion said Hamdi could contest his detention before a
neutral decision maker. Strictly speaking, however, the Hamdi ruling
only applies to citizens supporting forces hostile to the United States
in Afghanistan.
In Padilla v. Hanft, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a habeas corpus petition filed by an American citizen imprisoned in a military brig after having been designated an "enemy
combatant" by President Bush. 6 This is the most pertinent legal
authority. In this case, the prisoner associated with al Qaeda terrorists
in Afghanistan and then traveled to the United States for the purpose
of plotting attacks on American soil.! Padilla was arrested upon his
arrival at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago. 8 He was subsequently moved to a military brig in South Carolina. 9
During habeas proceedings, Padila's attorneys argued that the
President did not have the authority to detain citizens, without
charge, in a military brig-even if there was undeniable proof that the
citizen associated with al Qaeda.'0 The district court agreed and held
that Padilla either had to be criminally charged or released." The

4. See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); see also Timothy Lynch,
Hamdi and Habeas Corpus,WA.L ST.J., Apr. 23, 2004, at A14.
5. Hamd, 542 U.S. at 536.
6. 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005).
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.

Id. at 390.
Id.

Id.
Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 683-84 (D.S.C. 2005).
Id. at 692.
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court of appeals rejected that holding.' 2 Finding an enemy combatant's locus of capture irrelevant to the President's power to detain,
the court of appeals ruled that Padilla's military detention was lawful.'Specifically, the court held that "the President does possess such
authority pursuant
to the Authorization for Use of Military ForceJoint
14
Resolution."
Of course, one could try to distinguish the Padillacase on the
ground that the prisoner under consideration here associated with al
Qaeda in Somalia, not Afghanistan-and that this prisoner was never
in a combat zone during an armed conflict between al Qaeda forces
and the armed forces of the United States.15 Although impossible to
predict, it is extremely doubtful that the court of appeals would find
that distinction legally significant. Instead, the court would likely
reiterate its opinion that the AUMF must be "read in light of its
purpose clause (in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States) and its preamble (stating that the
acts of 9/11 render it both necessary and appropriate... to protect
United States citizens both at home and abroad)." 6 The AUMF
places emphasis on those responsible for the September 11 attacksthe al Qaeda organization-and is not concerned with geography.
According to the rationale of Padillav. Hanf, it makes no difference
whether al Qaeda terrorists are training and planning in Afghanistan,
Somalia, or Minnesota.
For the forgoing reasons, I conclude that President Obama does
have the authority, under current law, to detain the prisoner in
question,
at least if the military brig is located within the Fourth
1
Circuit.
I hasten to add that the President is unlikely to prevail in the Supreme Court in the long term. Even though the Supreme Court has

12. Padilla,423 F.3d at 397.
13. Id. at 389.
14. Id. The Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution is
commonly referred to as the AUMF.
15. The question says the prisoner is suspected of "links" to al Qaeda. It is
unclear what evidence the Government is relying upon here. When challenged, the
Government will be accorded some deference with respect to its decision to
incarcerate. Thejudiciary will not uphold the incarceration of a citizen on a hunch,
rumor, or merely on the president's say-so.
16. Padifla, 423 F.3d at 396 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
17. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on April 3,2006. Padilla v. Hanft,
547 U.S. 1062 (2006). The President could fortify his action by declaring the prisoner
in question an "enemy combatant."
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not addressed the issue squarely, there seems to be a majority of
justices who have indicated that, with respect to American citizens
who are on American soil, the President does not have the authority to
detain citizens in military brigs. 18 In sum, if the President's objective is
solely to detain this particular prisoner in a brig for six months, he has
a legal basis to do so, as already noted. However, if the President's
objective is to establish a precedent for detaining other citizens who
may be suSpected of abetting al Qaeda on American soil, he will very
likely fail.
2. WOULD IT BE LEGAL FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION TO
LAUNCH A PREDATOR STRIKE ON OSAMA BIN LADEN IF HE HAS BEEN
TRACKED TO A HOUSE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF KARACHI, PAKISTAN?

The use of a Predator strike to kill Osama bin Laden would be
legal under the United States's interpretation of its burden under
international law. The only party in a position to object is Pakistan,
and it is not clear that the Pakistani government would do so.
I.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The United States has long distinguished targeted killings against
legitimate military targets" from those prohibited by an Executive
Order2 l that bars the assassination of a foreign official in peacetime.
The United States's position has been that targeted killings are legal if
directed at (1) military commanders in a conventional armed conflict,
(2) guerrilla leaders in a counterinsurgency, or (3) terrorist group
leaders who pose a threat to U.S. citizens during peacetime.2
Legal analysis of the targeted killing of Osana bin Laden should
proceed in the second of the three categories. The first category is
not applicable because the conflict between the United States and al
Qaeda is not a conventional international armed conflict between two

18.

SeeHamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,554-79 (2004) (ScaliaJ., and Stevens,

J., dissenting); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 455-65 (2004) (Stevens,J, Souter,

J., GinsburgJ., and BreyerJ., dissenting).
19.

For additional background, see Timothy Lynch, Aff-ontto CivilLiberties,NAT.

L.J., Oct. 3, 2005; Timothy Lynch, Powerand Liberty in Wartime, 2003-2004 CATO SUP.
CT. REv. 23.
20. See W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination,ARMY LAw. 4, Dec. 1989.
21. Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 2.11, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981 Comp.), reprintedin 50
U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. V 1981).
22. Parks, supranote 20, at 4.
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"High Contracting Parties" as defined by the Geneva Convention of
1949.23

While the third paradigm-that of killing a terrorist leader in
peacetime-seems appropriate, it describes a legal situation different
than the one the United States has defined in its ongoing use of
military operations against al Qaeda and associated organizations. A
true peacetime situation would be one where Congress has not
authorized force against the terrorist organization, the United
Nations has not recognized such a conflict, and the U.S. Supreme
Court has not provided an interpretation of the legal standards for
the conduct of the conflict. In this case, the President would
unilaterally authorize the targeted killing as a measure taken in selfdefense as described in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 4
The ongoing conflict with al Qaeda is governed, somewhat counterintuitively, by the legal constraints of a domestic counterinsurgency. Congress approved the deployment of the military with its
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) .25 The United
Nations recognized the September 11 attacks on the United States
and the inherent right of nations to act in self-defense in response.26
Though the Bush administration declared that military operations
against al Qaeda and the Taliban were not governed by the Geneva
Conventions,27 the U.S. Supreme Court determined that military
operations under the AUMF are governed by Common Article 3, the
legal framework for an armed conflict between a High Contracting
Party ands a non-state actor within the High Contracting Party's
territory.2
11. APPLiCATION OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Osama bin Laden is not a uniformed officer in the armed forces
of a High Contracting Party. He is a civilian. Thus, the question turns
23. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
24. U.N. Charter art. 51.
25. Pub. L. No. 107-40,115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp.
V 2005)).
26. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
27. Memorandum fromJohn C. Yoo, Deputy AssistantAtt'y General, and Robert
J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzalez, Counsel to the President,
Treaties and Laws Applicable to the Conflict in Afghanistan and to the Treatment of
Persons Captured by U.S. Armed Forces in that Conflict (Nov. 30, 2001), availableat
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/aclu-ii-1 13001.pdf.
28. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629-30 (2006).
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on what criteria ought to be used to determine whether bin Laden
can lawfully be targeted.
Any targeted killing of bin Laden would have to comply with acceptedjus in bello principles: military objective, distinction, proportionality, and the prevention of unnecessary suffering.2
The United States has taken the position that an individual may
be deemed a "military objective" in a counterinsurgency by their
actions contributing to the hostilities. "A civilian who undertakes
military activities assumes a risk of attack, and efforts by military forces
to capture or kill that individual would not constitute assassination."0
Bin Laden meets the criteria of a civilian who has undertaken
military activities. He has publicly claimed responsibility for the death
of thousands of people in the attacks on September 11, 2001, and the
terrorist group that he leads, al Qaeda, has claimed many innocent
lives in the years since.
Additionally, any targeted killing would have to distinguish between the individual targeted and other civilians, and any foreseen
collateral damage would have to be proportional to the military gain
achieved. The prohibition on weapons that cause unnecessary
suffering includes incendiary, chemical, and other exotic technologies, but there is no prohibition on a bomb or missile.
III. NON-APPLICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I

It should be noted that the country where bin Laden is located
impacts the legal analysis with regard to using lethal force against
him. Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the Geneva Conventions restricts
the circumstances in which a civilian may be targeted with lethal
force.
Article 51 (3) of AP I says that civilians may only be targeted "for
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.01 Many commentators have referred to this as a "revolving door" standard-whenever a
civilian engages in hostilities they may be targeted, but as soon as they
put down their weapon or cease their direct participation in hostilities, they lose their status as legitimate military targets and must be
29. Jonathan Ulrich, The Gloves Were Never On: Defining the President'sAuthority to
OrderTargetedKillingin the War Against Terrorisn, 45 VA.J. INT'L L. 1029, 1051 (2005).
30. Parks, supranote 20, at 7.
31. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
art. 51 (3), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (June 1977); see also THE LAWS OFARMED CONFLICr 651
(Dietrich Schindler &Jiri Toman eds., 2d ed. 1981).
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captured instead of killed. The International Committee for the Red
Cross recently held a conference to define the limit of "direct
participation in hostilities," and the final resolution was so narrow that
a dozen nations withdrew rather than be associated with the legal
conclusion that it reached.
The United States recognizes some portions of AP I as customary
international law, but not Article 51(3). The United States is not a
signatory to AP I, and withdrew from a recent conference to define
what "direct participation in hostilities" means. The U.S. targeting
criteria remains broader, and bin Laden's leadership position at the
top of al Qaeda means that it will continue to claim him as a lawful
target-whether or not he is giving orders (or firing a gun, making a
propaganda video, etc.) at the time lethal force is employed against
him.
Pakistan remains one of the other nations that has not signed AP
I. Thus, it is unlikely that any objection on the part of the Pakistani
governmentwould be based on the "direct participation in hostilities"
legal analysis, where Pakistan would claim that the United States was
instead required to capture bin Laden instead of killing him.
Pakistan might still object to the targeted killing within its territory, but that would pit the U.N. Charter concepts of non-aggression
and self-defense against one another. The United States could claim
that the killing was lawful as an expression of self-defense under
Article 51 of the Charter. Pakistan's response would likely be based
on the Article 2(4) admonishment to refrain from the use of force in
international relations. While such a legal dispute is possible, it seems
unlikely that the Pakistani government would object too sternly, since
it has been cooperating with the United States in a targeted killing
campaign directed against internal insurgent leaders.
IV. CONCLUSION

The use of a Predator strike against any target is neither presumptively legal nor illegal. If used against a high-level and admitted
terrorist leader such as bin Laden, particularly in a country (such as
Pakistan) that has not adopted the more restrictive targeting regime
of AP I, there are clear legal grounds for such an attack. Any targeted
killing, even with a high-level target, must still conform to jus in bello
principles, and the expected collateral damage cannot rise to such a
level as to be disproportionate to the military gain expected.
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4. DID MEMBERS OF THEJUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL COMMIT MALPRACTICE IN 2002 BY ITS WRITTEN GUIDANCE
TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ON INTERROGATION
STANDARDS?

The answer to this question will turn upon the definition of "misconduct" and the standard by which an alleged violation of professional responsibility will be adjudicated.
To begin, one must first distinguish "misconduct" from "malpractice." The latter, a failure to exercise an attorney's requisite standard
of care, which further causes damage to the client, is grounds for an
action in tort. The former is a violation of the ethical and competence standards that may provide grounds for professional discipline
by the attorney's jurisdiction.
Prisoners impacted by the interrogation memoranda had no attorney-client relationship upon which to base a suit for malpractice.
Litigation underway underscores this point. Jose Padilla, an American
citizen who was held as a domestic enemy combatant and subsequently convicted for material support of terrorism, has filed suit against
one of the attorneys responsible for the interrogation memoranda. 2
That suit is based on a claim that the attorney violated his rights
under color of law, not malpractice stemming from an attorney-client
relationship. Thus, "professional misconduct" is the appropriate
inquiry for possible wrongdoing by lawyers working within the Office
of Legal Counsel (OLC).
Attorneys working in the OLC authored written guidance to the
CIA on the legal standards for the interrogation of detainees. The
advice came primarily in the form of two written memoranda issued
on August 1, 2002.
The first memorandum, Standardsof Conductfor Interrogationunder
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, 3 advised that the physical pain associated
with an interrogation would have to be equivalent to that caused by
organ failure or death to violate the federal statute implementing the
United States's obligations under the Convention Against Torture.
The memorandum also concluded that international standards allow
treatment that is cruel, inhuman, or degrading, but does not amount
to torture. The memorandum concluded with a finding that the
32. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
33. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzalez, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-gonzales-aug2002.pdf.
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torture statute may be an unconstitutional infringement of the
President's commander in chief powers, and that common law
defenses of necessity and self-defense may eliminate criminal liability
for violations of the torture statute.
The second memorandum, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative,34
responded to a CIA inquiry on the legality of specific interrogation
techniques. The techniques included stress positions, sleep deprivation, placing insects in a confinement box to exploit a prisoner's
phobia, and waterboarding. The memorandum concluded that none
of those techniques would violate the torture statute, and that the
CIA's safety precautions would negate any claim that the interrogators' mental state met the requirements for a violation of the torture
statute.
The Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) conducted a
review of these memoranda and other legal claims regarding the
scope of the power of the Executive when military force has been
authorized by Congress. The OPR Final Report found that the
authors of the memoranda authorizing the use of coercive interrogation techniques committed professional misconduct.3 However, the
Department ofJustice official responsible for resolving challenges to
negative OPR findings subsequently issued a Memorandum of
Decision vetoing the finding of misconduct.6
The OPR final report relied upon rules set forth in the District of
Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct that require attorneys to
provide competent representation to their clients (competence) and
the duty to exercise independent legal judgment and to render
candid legal advice (advisor). The Office of Professional Responsibility further said that intentional misconduct requires the provision of
34. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel for the Cent. Intelligence Agency,
Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative
(Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-bybee2002.pdf.
35. See OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, INVESTIGATION INTO THE
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL'S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENrRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S USE OF"ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES" ON SUSPECTED
TERRORISTS
251-54
(July
29,
2009),
available
at

http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/issuesOPRReport.html.
36. See Memorandum from David Margolis, Associate Deputy Att'y Gen., to the
Att'y Gen. & Deputy Att'y Gen., Memorandum of Decision Regarding the Objections
to the Findings of Professional Misconduct in the Office of Professional Responsibility's Report of Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of "Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques" on Suspected Terrorists, 67 Uan. 5, 2010), availableat
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAGMargolisMemolO105.pdf.
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legal advice that reaches a desired conclusion in spite of an unambiguous obligation or standard that bars that result, and that reckless
misconduct occurs where the attorney knows or should know that
their conduct will violate an unambiguous obligation or standard.
The Memorandum of Decision that vetoed the OPR finding of
misconduct argued that OPR failed to properly identify an unambiguous standard by which "professional misconduct" could bejudged.
The Memorandum of Decision found that while the interrogation
memoranda did not cite dissenting opinions in an international
decision that found techniques parallel to the ones the CIA proposed
were torture, there was no clear duty to do so. The Memorandum of
Decision also found that, while the interrogation memoranda came to
conclusions at the fringe of commonly accepted interpretations of
executive power, those conclusions did not constitute professional
misconduct if they were arrived at in good faith and without an intent
to arrive at a pre-ordained result.
The ultimate conclusion of the Memorandum of Decision
appears sound and persuasive. The conduct of war has historically
been the province of the executive. In the wake of devastating attacks
by a non-state entity, lawyers serving the executive answered questions
about the limits of wartime powers in a frame of law that has since
changed. The subsequent rescission of the interrogation memoranda37 and the Supreme Court's application of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions to the conflict with al Qaeda s8 irrevocably altered
the legal framework for international counterterrorism such that the
answers to those questions are now different. Without clear evidence
that the attorneys who authored the interrogation memoranda
intended to authorize illegal conduct, refutation of their conclusions
is appropriate, but professional sanctions are not.
5.

WHAT STATUTORY CHANGE IS MOST NECESSARY FOR AMERICAN
NATIONAL SECURITY?

Too many people assume that more laws and more expenditures
are the best ways to enhance American national security. Policymakers ought to consider existing policies that may be wrongheaded,
wasteful, or counterproductive. The Federal Government's "war on
37. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, ActingAssistantAtt'y Gen., to the Deputy
Attorney General, Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec.
30, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/18usc2340234Oa2.htm.

38.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629 (2006).
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drugs" is an example of a policy that is actually creating more
problems than it is solving. In fact, the drug war is so misguided that
it has actually undermined American national security. Ending the
war will thus enhance American national security.
I.

TERRORISTS REAP BENEFITS FROM BLACK MARKETS

When the government bans a product that millions of people
want, the market does not suddenly disappear. The policy merely
drives that market "underground," and we refer to the millions of
illegal transactions as a "black market." Drug prohibition channels
more than $40 billion per year into a criminal underworld that is
occupied by an assortment of criminals, corrupt politicians, and
terrorists. Alcohol prohibition drove reputable companies into other
industries or out of business altogether, which paved the way for
mobsters to make millions in the black market. In the years immediately following September 11, the Bush administration tried to
scapegoat drug users for helping to fund terrorism, but that reasoning
is perverse. Beer drinkers did not want to enrich mobsters like Al
Capone, but the policy of alcohol prohibition made that happen. In
the same way, the drug war diverts a river of money to criminal and
terrorist organizations.
There is also a blowback effect from foreign-aid packages.
Though the money the United States sends to foreign governments to
help combat the drug trade is given in good faith, research indicates
that that money can actually bolster it. Ted Galen Carpenter argues
that America's prohibitionist strategy fuels the massive black market
that makes the cultivation of drug crops far more lucrative than legal
ones.39 This is because America's drug war aims to reduce the supply
of drug crops which, in turn, pushes up their value as demand
remains strong.
Indeed, this very dynamic has created security problems in Mexico. Carpenter writes, "An incident in Nuevo Laredo illustrates just
how brazen the traffickers have become and how contemptuous they
are of government authorities."4 Carpenter is referring to a Mexican
cartel's "help-wanted" advertisement that was posted in public for all
39. TED GALEN CARPENTER, FOREIGN POLICYBRIEFING NO.
IN AFGHANISTAN UNDERMINES AMERICA'S WAR ON TERROR

84, HOWTHE DRUGWAR
5 (2004), available at

http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb84.pdf.
40. Ted Galen Carpenter, DrugGangs Winning the Warfor Mexico, Hous. CHRON.
(Feb.

7,

2009),

available

at

http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/editorial/outlook/6251540.html.
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to see. It read, "The Zetas want you, soldier or ex-soldier.
We offer a
4
good salary, food and benefits for your family." '
Another unintended consequence of the drug war has been to
sharpen the skills of drug smugglers. Steven Duke and Albert Gross
write, "There is a cadre of experienced smugglers who actually benefit
from more intense interdiction efforts. 4 This is because those who
have survived as smugglers have learned how to stay ahead of the
game. "More stringent control of the border," in other words,
"merely knocks novices out of the trade, reducing competition and
increasing profits for the survivors." 43 Given such circumstances, it is
not difficult to imagine a terrorist organization soliciting the services
of a drug cartel to smuggle operatives or weapons into the United
States.
II. SETrING PRIORITIES
Since the calamity of the September 11 attacks, U.S. intelligence
officials have warned of the danger of further attacks. Given that
danger, it is a gross misallocation of law enforcement resources to
have federal agents raiding marijuana clubs in California when they
could be helping to follow up on leads concerning terrorists who may
already be on American soil.
Former police chief Joseph McNamara argues that the "war
against terrorism requires a reassessment of law enforcement and
security priorities, especially in regard to the resources we now
expend in the 'war on drugs. "'"He's right. There are only a limited
number of federal agents and a limited number of hours in a day.
The Government must learn how to prioritize. And first on the list of
priorities is the fight against al Qaeda, not consumers of illegal drugs.
We should not forget the example of the Phoenix FBI office that
knew about al Qaeda activity in U.S. flight schools prior to the
September 11 attacks, but who could not get the Bureau's main office
in Washington D.C. to take action simply because members of that
office were mandated to focus on arson cases, not potential instances
of terrorism.
A similar point is made by Mark A. R. Kleiman who, in a report
for Congress, lists five potential links between the drug trade and
41.

Id.

42.

STEVEN B. DuKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING
OUR TRAGIc CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS 231 (G.P. Putnam's Sons 1993).

43.

Id.

44. Joseph McNamara, The DefensiveFrontLine, REGULATION, Winter 2001, at 63.
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terrorism, one of which is "competition for enforcement resources."45
He writes, "The targeting of enforcement and intelligence resources
sometimes involves choosing between counter-drug targets and
counter-terror targets. Other things being equal, the larger the drug
trafficking problem, the larger the resources required to combat it,
and those resources may then be unavailable for use against terrorist
targets." 6
Kleiman notes that certain U.S. agencies appear to be cognizant
of this, and thus are incrementally shifting priorities away from drug
enforcement to focus more on countering terrorism.
The events of September 11 have already taken a toll on
drug enforcement. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has
announced that a substantial fraction of the agents it had
assigned to drug law enforcement will be reassigned to meet
the threat of terrorism. The United States Customs Service
has also redirected some of its investigative resources...
[and] the share of the DEA in the total federal law enforcement budget is not fixed, [thus] it is possible that the
agency's growth will be slowed by the budgetary demands of
the anti-terror effort.47
Some of the language Kleiman uses, however, suggests that the
United States is still not fully committed to substantially reducing the
resources invested in its drug war.
The Drug Enforcement Administration has more than 10,000
agents, intelligence analysts, and support staff members. Their skills
would be much better used if those people were redeployed to
counterterrorism investigations. Congress can and should bring the
misguided drug war to an end by repealing the federal criminal
statute, the Controlled Substances Act.

45.
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